The onset of U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran in late February 2026 triggered Iranian retaliations, including Iranian efforts to assert control over the Strait of Hormuz (the Strait) via threatened and actual attacks on commercial shipping. The Strait, which comprises both Iranian and Omani territorial waters, is a key waterway, particularly for the transit of oil and natural gas and other commodities to world markets. In 2025, roughly 25% of the world’s maritime trade in crude oil and petroleum products, as well as roughly 19% of liquefied natural gas, passed through the Strait. Congress follows events related to the Strait because of their potential impacts on global prices for these energy commodities. This concern could prompt congressional oversight of related U.S. policy options, including military action or sanctions. Iranian attacks led to a precipitous drop in cross-Strait traffic, with resulting disruptions to global energy markets. Oil, petroleum products, and natural gas, in particular, were greatly affected, which was reflected in price changes for these commodities. Although the market for these commodities was able to absorb some of the conflict-related market shocks, the longer conditions in the Strait are uncertain, the more difficult it will be to compensate for the supply disruptions. U.S. sanctions policy, including the prospect of sanctions relief as well as the threat or imposition of new sanctions, continues to be relevant. An April 7, 2026, U.S.-Iran ceasefire halted major combat operations, but Iran continued efforts to exert control over the Strait, specifically by attempting to route ships through its territorial waters rather than through long-standing shipping lanes and by attacking noncompliant ships. In response, the United States imposed a blockade on shipping to or from Iranian ports. On June 17, 2026, President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) declaring the “removal of [the U.S.] naval blockade” and Iranian “arrangements ... for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge, for 60 days only,” with “the future administration” of the Strait to be determined by Iran in consultation with Oman and other Persian Gulf (Gulf) states. As of early August 2026, the United States has reimposed its naval blockade in response to renewed attacks on commercial vessels and several Arab states by Iran, which has accused the United States of not meeting its MOU obligations. Initially, the reaction to the MOU was to calm markets; as conflict has renewed, uncertainty in the markets has increased. As of early August 2026, Iranian government leaders appear to view formalizing their asserted control over the entirety of the Strait as critical to their national interests. Iran evidently maintains enough military capability to continue to conduct attacks; those attacks have compelled most ships to either accede to Iranian demands or not transit the Strait. U.S. efforts undertaken, or proposed by President Trump and other U.S. officials, to secure free transit through the Strait since March 2026 include U.S. attacks against Iranian mine-laying vessels, land-based missile sites, and other military assets used to disrupt cross-Strait traffic; the provision of political risk insurance by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation; “Project Freedom,” a May 2026 attempt to help ships navigate the Strait; subsequent less-public efforts to coordinate ships’ transit of the Strait; and a U.S. project to become “the Guardian Angel” of the Strait, per President Trump, in exchange for payments or investment in the United States by Gulf countries. U.S. ground operations along Iran’s coast or other military actions (to neutralize Iranian military capabilities and/or pressure Iranian leaders to cease attacks) could occur, a status quo of traded attacks across the Strait could persist, or the United States could choose to decrease its presence and activity in the Gulf region. Future arrangements concerning the management and security of the Strait of Hormuz will have significant implications for Iran, which is seeking to establish unprecedented control over the Strait; for Iraq and the Gulf Arab states, whose economies are largely reliant on energy exports through the Strait; for the United States, which has long maintained a significant force posture in the region, in part because of the U.S. interest, articulated by multiple Administrations, in ensuring the free transit of the region’s energy resources; and for countries, particularly in Asia, that rely on those energy resources.
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