U.S. relations with Turkey (Türkiye), a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally, have alternated between close cooperation and notable division. Despite Turkey’s NATO membership and close trade and investment relations with the European Union (EU), Turkey appears to be one of a host of “middle powers” inclined to diversify their foreign relationships within a more multipolar global system. Turkey’s increasingly assertive foreign policy is buttressed by its growing defense industry, which supplies combat-proven drones and other equipment to many other countries. Turkey’s regional influence has grown considerably during the 23-year-rule of President (and previously Prime Minister) Recep Tayyip Erdogan, amid a number of controversial domestic policy developments. During the past decade, the United States and Turkey have differed sharply on some major issues, including the U.S. military’s former partnership with Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against the Islamic State organization, Turkey’s 2019 procurement of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system, and U.S. actions in response to the acquisition (suspending a sale of F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey and imposing sanctions in 2020 under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA). These U.S.-Turkey rifts appear to have somewhat diminished given U.S. and Turkish efforts to (1) strengthen NATO and Ukraine since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine; and (2) work with a new, generally pro-Turkish, Sunni Arab-led interim government in Syria after the 2024 fall of Bashar Al Asad. In January 2026, the U.S. partnership with the SDF effectively ended as Syrian government forces took control of northern Syrian areas previously governed by the SDF. As of August 2026, Turkey seeks F-35s from the United States, along with the removal of CAATSA sanctions. During the current Trump Administration, some U.S. officials have cultivated close working relationships with Turkish counterparts on diplomacy regarding Iran, Syria, Ukraine, and Gaza. Analysts debate whether potential strategic and economic advantages from U.S. partnership with Turkey should incline the Trump Administration and Congress toward greater engagement, or whether Turkey’s hedging behavior, energy and economic ties with Russia, differences with some other U.S. partners, or domestic controversies should give U.S. policymakers and lawmakers pause on closer cooperation. Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey, including on possible arms sales and how to address existing sanctions and legislative conditions. For example, U.S. legislation currently prohibits the transfer of F-35s to Turkey unless Turkey no longer possesses the Russian-origin S-400 system (or other associated items). President Donald Trump has expressed openness to an F-35 sale to Turkey, but the State Department reportedly informed some Members of Congress in July 2026 that Turkey has “not yet met” the conditions for an F-35 transfer. A Turkish sale of the S-400 system to a third country could be subject to Russian approval or generate additional U.S. security concerns. A U.S. transfer of F-35s to Turkey could decrease any relative military advantages that other countries possessing or seeking to acquire F-35s (including Israel and Greece) might have. The 2026 U.S./Israel-Iran conflict and its impact on the Middle East balance of power could have consequences for U.S.-Turkey cooperation. Turkey strengthened defense ties with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in August 2026 via the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement. Increased Turkey-Israel tensions and greater Israeli closeness with Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, and the United Arab Emirates could reinforce Turkish efforts to partner more closely with other countries in the region (including Egypt and Qatar). Turkey and Israel continue vying for influence in post-civil war Syria—further straining relations that were already worsened by Turkey’s continuing support for the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas after its October 2023 attacks and hostage-taking in Israel, and actions by Israel’s military and government in Gaza. After the steady consolidation of power by President Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP), Erdogan’s government has arguably taken its strongest actions to date against Turkey’s political opposition over the past two years. Those moves include the 2025 imprisonment of Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, perhaps Erdogan’s most popular potential rival, and the court-ordered ouster in 2026 of Ozgur Ozel as the leader of the Republican People’s Party. Ozel established the Yeni (New) Party in July 2026; the party’s prospects of mounting credible electoral opposition to the AKP are unclear. Turkey also faces some economic challenges, including official annual inflation of over 30%. In parallel with these developments, Erdogan is pursuing an effort to end a decades-long insurgency by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), perhaps partly in hopes of gaining Kurdish voters’ support for constitutional changes in Turkey and/or another presidential term for Erdogan. Elections are legally required by May 2028. The PKK has taken some steps toward demobilization, and Turkey’s parliament has empowered a commission to verify PKK disarmament and approve the repatriation and effective amnesty of thousands of PKK members or supporters based in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere.
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